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Paternity Un(certainty): How the Law
Surrounding Paternity Challenges Negatively




It is popularly believed that false paternity rates are 10-30%, and that
thousands of unsuspecting men are supporting children who are not theirs. These
reported rates offalse paternity have become urban legend, demonizing women
as over-sexualized partners who shouldn't be trusted. This in turn has influenced
laws regarding paternity, which have evolved to allow men to disestablish
paternity years after a child's birth, even when there has been an adjudication or
acknowledgment of paternity. This article argues that society should be cautious
about elevating science as the highest consideration in truth claims about
paternity. It examines the incoherent and inconsistent nature of family law
concerning paternity challenges, and it illustrates ways modern cases elide the
reasons a woman might keep paternity questions secret-for instance, when
women have been subjected to domestic violence or sexual assault. Challenges to
paternity involve complex factors which should not be reduced to the results of a
DNA test.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The British television producer Chris Lewis, known for his work on the 2012
Olympics, sued his ex-wife for £300,000 when DNA tests suggested that she had
deceived him about the paternity of their seventeen-year-old son.' In the United
States, fears of false paternity have given rise to do-it-yourself paternity tests, and
organizations such as U.S. Citizens Against Paternity Fraud and Women Against
Paternity Fraud claim that "28-30% of fathers tested for paternity are not the real
father."2 Paternity fraud engages our attention during afternoon episodes of The
Maury Show,3 as well as in more high-brow entertainment, such as the film
starring Meryl Streep and Julia Roberts, August: Osage County.' Even rappers
like Kanye West fret about paternity fraud:
18 years, 18 years
She got one of your kids, got you for 18 years
I know somebody paying child support for one of his kids
His baby mamma car and crib is bigger than his
You will see him on TV any given Sunday
Win the Superbowl and drive off in a Hyundai
She was supposed to buy your shorty TYCO with your money
She went to the doctor got lipo with your money
She walking around looking like Michael with your money
Should've got that insured got GEICO for your money,
money, money
If you ain't no punk holla we want prenup
WE WANT PRENUP! Yeah
It's something that you need to have
'Cause when she leave yo ass she gon' leave with half
18 years, 18 years
And on her 18th birthday he found out it wasn't his.'
' Rosemary Bennett, TV Producer Sues Ex-Wife for £300,000 Over Child 'Lie,' THE TIMES (Apr. 27,
2015, 12:01 AM), http://www.thetimes.co.uk/tto/law/article4423187.ece.
2 See Grecia Aguilar, Women Against Paternity Fraud Advocating for Men and Children, 23 ABC
NEWS BAKERSFIELD (June 19, 2015, 3:06 PM), http://www.tumto23.com/news/local-news/women-
against-patemity-fraud-advocating-for-men-and-children-061815; see About Us, U.S. CITIZENS
AGAINST PATERNITY FRAUD, http://www.patemityfraud.com/paternityfraud-aboutus.html.
3 See MAURY, http://www.mauryshow.com/ (last visited Feb. 5, 2017).
4 AUGUST: OSAGE COUNTY (Weinstein Co. 2013).
' Kanye West, Gold Digger, AZ LYRICS, http://www.azlyrics.com/lyrics/kanyewest/golddigger.html
(last visited Feb. 5, 2017).
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The hype surrounding paternity fraud is a relatively recent development, gathering
steam in the late twentieth century as the field of human genetics blossomed with
the Human Genome Project.6
In contrast, in the late nineteenth century, scientific testing could not
accurately eliminate a man as the biological father of a child. Since a man could
never be certain of his paternity, cuckoldry was a humiliating possibility, as even
Goethe realized: "A man must take his children on trust."' The problem of
paternity fraud or paternity uncertainty is a central issue in Karen Shepard's 2013
historical novel, The Celestials,8 about Chinese strikebreakers who came to work
in a shoe factory in North Adams, Massachusetts in the late 1800s. The factory
owner's wife has an affair with the Chinese foreman, which results in the birth of
an Asian-American daughter.9 Calvin Sampson, the husband, at first rejects the
baby, but agrees to raise her as his own.'o Paternity fraud is also a central issue in
August Strindberg's 1887 play, The Father,'' about a husband's and wife's bitter
struggle for control over their daughter. In Strindberg's play, the husband (called
simply "The Captain"), has no reason to question his paternity. However, he is
driven insane by his wife's implication that he might not be the father of his
child,'2 in what is clearly a power-play on the wife's part to keep her teenage
daughter from being sent away to boarding school.'" Unlike Sampson, the Captain
insists that if he isn't the father, he will immediately reject his daughter, because
a man should not have to support a child that is not his.' 4 Both fictional works are
set in the late 1800s, before the availability of genetic testing for paternity, and
both focus on the problem of false paternity or paternity uncertainty.
While neither Sampson nor the Captain could be certain of their paternity in
the late 1800s, today both could obtain DNA testing to determine their paternity
6 See Mary R. Anderlik, Disestablishment Suits: What Hath Science Wrought?, 4 J. CTR. FOR FAMS.,
CHILD. & CTS. 3,3-4 (2003).
AUGUST STRINDBERG, THE FATHER, MISS JULIE, THE GHOST SONATA 54 (Michael Meyer trans.,
2013) (quoting Goethe in The Father). See also, DiMichele v. Perrella, 2014 WL 2022243, * 2 (Conn.
Super. Ct. Apr. 16, 2014) (quoting Shakespeare's The Merry Wives of Windsor, act 2, sc. 2, 1073-99,
"See the hell of having a false woman! . . . Fie, fie, fie! cuckold, cuckold, cuckold!").
See KAREN SHEPARD, THE CELESTIALS (2013). At the time the novel takes place, China was known
as "The Celestial Empire." Id. at 19.
9 Id. at 169-70.
" Id. at 180, 338. Sampson agrees to raise the child as his own after his wife, Julia, takes the infant
and moves out of town.
" See STRINDBERG, supra note 7, at 15.
12 The wife, Laura, taunts the Captain that "You can't be sure that you are Bertha's father," and when
he asks her, "Are you trying to be funny?," she responds, "I'm only repeating what you've taught me."
Laura learned this from a conversation opening the play, between the Captain and a soldier, who
denied paternity of an unmarried pregnant woman he had promised to marry and then impregnated.
Id. at 45, 27-29.
13 Id. at 58.
14 Id. at 57-58 (quoting the Captain: "Do you think I'd want to keep some other man's child if I knew
you were guilty [of adultery?]").
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with almost 100% certainty. In other words, today, science prevails. This article
examines three points in arguing that society should be cautious about elevating
science as the highest consideration in truth claims. Part one argues that society's
moral panic about rates of false paternity demonizes women and influences
paternity disestablishment legislation. Using Carol Smart's modified Foucaultian
approach to family law discourse, part two considers the incoherent nature of
family law concerning paternity challenges. Part three contends that modem cases
elide the reasons a woman might keep paternity questions secret, and that it is
important to bring these reasons to light in order to pave the way for change in
legislation and judicial decision-making.
A. Moral Panics and Rates ofFalse Paternity
Rates of false paternity are lower than commonly believed; however, with the
availability of over-the-counter and on-line genetics tests, high rates of false
paternity have become urban legend, which in turn has demonized women as
defrauding scores of unsuspecting men. '5 It is popularly believed that false
paternity rates are 10-30%.'6 For instance, the Florida case of Parker v. Parker
asserts that the rate of false paternity (or, as the court states, children who "were
the product of adultery") is at least 10%.17 An even higher rate is quoted in the
dissenting opinion of Marriage/Children of Betty L. W v. William E. W, which
relies on the often-cited finding by the American Association of Blood Banks
America: of 280,000 paternity cases, almost one-third excluded the tested
individual.'I In other words, "almost 100,000 men were falsely accused of being
the father of a child [whom] they simply did not father."
Despite the common belief that false paternity rates are 10-30%, studies by
cultural anthropologists indicate that the overall rate of false paternity is lower
than popularly believed, and that it is not static, but is tied to paternity
" See Leslie Cannold, Who's the Father? Rethinking the Moral "Crime" of "Paternity Fraud," 31
WOMEN'S STUD. INT'L F. 249, 250 (2008) (explaining that "Fathers' rights discourse articulates ...
ways in which paternity fraud cheats or defrauds men or children" and fathers' rights discourse labels
"paternity fraud" as widespread); Lyn Turney, Paternity Secrets: Why Women Don't Tell, II J. OF
FAM. STUD. 227, 227-29 (2005) (citing the popular figure of"between 10 and 30%" and arguing that
society tends to demonize women as "predatory, deceptive, and instrumental" in perpetuating paternity
fraud. Turney also blames "media and its audiences" for an increased interest in paternity testing.).
6 Turney, supra note 15, at 228.
"Parker v. Parker, 916 So. 2d 926, 928 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005), affd, 950 So.2d 388 (Fla. 2007).
8 Compare In re Marriage/Child. of Betty L.W. v. William E.W., 569 S.E.2d 77, 88 (W. Va. 2002)
(Maynard, Elliot E., dissenting) (basing its data upon testing in 1999), with Women Against Paternity
Fraud advocating for men and children (describing that a non-profit organization cites 28-30% of
false paternity according to American Association of Blood Banks), http://www.turnto23.com/news/lo
cal-news/women-against-patemity-fraud-advocating-for-men-and-children-061815 (June 19, 2015),
and Kristen Jacobs, Ifthe Genes Don't Fit: an Overview ofPaternity Disestablishment Statutes, 24 J.
AM. ACAD. MATRIM. LAWS., 249, 256 (2011).
" William E. W., 569 S.E.2d at 88.
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confidence. 20 Researchers Kermyt Anderson and Peter Gray found that in men
with low paternity confidence, the rate of false paternity was 30%; but in men
with high paternity confidence, the rate of false paternity was 2-3%.21 Paternity
confidence depends on men's "perceptions of the sexual fidelity of their mates
and on the degree of trust and commitment within the relationship." 22 Anderson
and Gray explain that men may have low paternity confidence when the couple is
not married or when the pregnancy is a surprise. 23 Moreover, a man may also
reevaluate his paternity confidence after the baby is born, based on whether the
baby resembles him. 24 So, although the overall rate of false paternity differs for
various cultures, in their study of Albuquerque, New Mexico, Anderson and Gray
derived a rate of 3.7%, and noted that there is probably a higher rate in populations
that are unstable-for instance, in populations that have a high rate of men in
prison, in the military, or in migratory labor.25 This first point is important to what
follows because urban legend regarding high rates of false paternity has been used
to demonize women as overly-sexualized adulteresses who should not be trusted,
which in turn has influenced both legislation and case law.
B. Incoherent Family Laws on Paternity Fraud
Laws regarding paternity are incoherent not only amongst jurisdictions, but
also within individual jurisdictions. As this part demonstrates, changes in the
Uniform Parentage Act were shaped by both federal child support legislation and
by scientific advances in paternity testing. States adopted versions of the Uniform
Parentage Act or enacted statutes to comply with federal legislation in a
patchwork fashion, resulting in vast inconsistencies across and within
jurisdictions. These inconsistencies may be analyzed through a modified-
Foucaultian approach, which explores the tensions between kinship claims and
best interests of the child on one hand, and scientific claims to the truth of DNA
tests on the other. Moreover, these laws may be critiqued as regulating women's
sexuality because they deny a mother's right to choose who should be the father
of her child, and also because they reinstitute heart balm remedies, such as various
tort claims for paternity fraud.
20 PETER B. GRAY & KERMYT G. ANDERSON, FATHERHOOD: EVOLUTION AND HUMAN PATERNAL
BEHAVIOR, 103-05 (2010). Gray and Anderson refer to "nonpatemity," rather than "false paternity."
Id.; Turney, supra note 15, at 228.
21 GRAY & ANDERSON, supra note 20, at 104-05.
22 Id. at 111.
23 Id.
24 Id. at 111-12. Anderson and Gray note that studies "in the United States, Canada, and Mexico have
found that the mother's relatives are more likely than the father's relatives to say that the new baby
looks like the father-presumably hoping to reinforce his paternity confidence and downplay any
doubts he may have."; Turney, supra note 15, at 228 (citing sources indicating that the rate of false
paternity is between 1-4%). Id. at 112.
25 GRAY & ANDERSON, supra note 20, at 106.
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II. OVERVIEW
Before the 1973 Uniform Parentage Act (UPA), common law distinguished
legitimate and illegitimate children. 26 Children were presumed legitimate if "bom
in lawful wedlock or within a competent time afterwards." 27 This presumption of
legitimacy could be rebutted with proof of the husband's impotence or his absence
"beyond the four seas." 28 An illegitimate child could not inherit from his mother
or father, and when he died without heirs or a spouse, his property escheated to
the state. 29
The common-law distinction between legitimate and illegitimate children
was abolished by the 1973 UPA, a model act which provided that all children
were legitimate, despite the parents' marital status. 30 Under the UPA,
presumptions of paternity included the common law marital presumption,' along
with presumptions of paternity for an unmarried man who filed a claim of
paternity, one who "received a child into his home and held the child out as his,"
one who was named (with his consent) on the child's birth certificate, or one who
was ordered to pay child support.32 In order to challenge paternity, a party with
standing could file a paternity suit and attempt to prove a biological relationship
by clear and convincing evidence; however, genetic testing based on blood tests
were not highly accurate-they "excluded a man inaccurately identified as the
biological father only 55% of the time." 33
After Congress mandated child-support enforcement programs because of the
increasing number of children born outside of marriage, 34 the 2002 UPA was
drafted to comply with federal requirements. 3' The 2002 UPA extended the
statute of limitations to establish paternity up until the child's eighteenth
26 HOMER H. CLARK, JR., THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 149-50 (2d ed.
1988).
27 Id. at 151 (quoting I WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *446, *454).
28 Id. at 152.
291 Id. at 149-50.
30 Id. at 150 (explaining in the 1960s, before the UPA, the United States Supreme Court began issuing
decisions that struck down many disabilities of illegitimate children).
3' Leslie Joan Harris, Reforming Paternity Law to Eliminate Gender, Status, and Class Inequality,
2013 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1295, 1301-02 (2013). The marital presumption also included children born
within 300 days of the marriage's termination, or children bom after the marriage when the husband
filed an acknowledgement. Id.
32 Id. at 1301-02.
31 Id. at 1302-03.
3 See Leslie Joan Harris, A New Paternity Law For The Twenty-First Century: Of Biology, Social
Function, Children's Interests, and Betrayal, 44 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 297, 297, 300 (2007).
[hereinafter A New Paternity Law] (noting that "In the 1970s, about 90 percent of all children were
born to married women," whereas by the early twenty-first century, "about one-third of all children
are born to unmarried women").
35 See id. at 311.
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birthday. 36 However, if there was a presumption of paternity, it could be
challenged only within two years of a child's birth, and even then a court retained
discretion to refuse to order a genetic test based on principles of estoppel and best
interest of the child.37
The 2002 UPA also complied with federal law by providing that a mother
and alleged father could sign a Voluntary Acknowledgment of Paternity (VAP),
which would have the effect of an adjudication of paternity. " Federal law
provided that a VAP could be rescinded within sixty days of birth or any order
regarding the child, and after that, could be challenged based on "fraud, duress,
or material mistake of fact."39 However, federal law did not provide a time limit
for VAP challenges, and did not define what constituted "fraud, duress, or
material mistake of fact." 40 Under the UPA, the time limit for VAP challenges
was two years after the VAP was filed, but a court could reject challenges on the
basis of estoppel and best interest of the child.4 '
As discussed more fully below, states that adopted the 2002 UPA or enacted
other statutes to comply with federal child-support enforcement provisions, did so
in unique ways, resulting in vast inconsistencies across jurisdictions. For example,
in Oregon, the UPA Working Group struggled to decide whether biology or the
father-child relationship should determine the outcome of paternity challenges. 42
The majority view and the ultimate conclusion of the Working Group was that a
court should retain discretion not to sever a father-child relationship because:
[S]ociety has a legitimate interest in protecting children from
harm, especially in situations where the legal father has also had
a social relationship with the child. Although we cannot
legislate that fathers have continuing social relationships with
their children, social policy does not and law should not
condone severing these relationships. 43
Similarly, legal counsel in the District of Columbia explained that the goal of
the District's conclusive presumption regarding a VAP was both finality of
judgment and the need for child support." The District's statute allows judges to
36 Id. at 312.
3 Id. at 315-16.
"Id. at 313.
3 Id.; see also Caroline Rogus, Fighting the Establishment: The Need for Procedural Reform of Our
Paternity Laws, 21 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 67, 80, 90 (2014).
40 A New Paternity Law, supra note 34, at 313-14.
41 Id. at 316-17.
42 Id. at 318.
43 Id. at 319 (quoting OREGON LAW COMMISSION UNIFORM PARENTAGE ACT WORK GROUP.
ESTABLISHING, DISESTABLISHING, AND CHALLENGING LEGAL PATERNITY 12 (2007)).
* See Rogus, supra note 39, at 85-86 (pointing out problems with the statute in terms of protecting
men who sign VAPs).
243
The Journal of Gender, Race & Justice
deny court-ordered genetic testing for men who do not get their own genetic tests
before they sign a VAP, and also allows a one-year statute of limitations to
challenge a VAP after the rescission period.45
A. A Modified-Foucaultian Approach to Today's Laws
Today, laws concerning paternity challenges are incoherent and inconsistent.
The rebuttable common law presumption that a husband is the father has given
way to a web of inconsistent laws allowing both paternity challenges and civil tort
actions for patemity fraud. Today, there are myriad presumptions for paternity,
and paternity may be established through adjudication (which may include a
divorce decree reciting children born of the marriage), or paternity may be
established when the mother and father sign an acknowledgment of patemity.
In analyzing these inconsistent paternity laws, I use Carol Smart's modified-
Foucaultian approach. 46 Smart describes modem family law as having "two
parallel mechanisms of power, each with its own discourse, the discourse of rights
and the discourse of normalization."47 I will refer to these two parallel powers as
the "old view" (Smart's rights discourse in which truth is associated with kinship
and best interests of the child), and the "modem view" (Smart's normalization
discourse in which truth is associated with biology).48 Smart modifies Foucault's
description of discourses of power because she observes that family law continues
to exercise some of the ancient regime power that Foucault no longer finds in
modem power regimes (the old view).49 But Smart notes that family law also
exercises a discourse of normalization that Foucault describes, in which it defers
to the truth of science (the modern view). 50
So under the old view (discourse of rights), law's power is not diminishing
as Foucault describes, but rather, law incorporates other social discourses, such as
psychology, yet law ultimately exercises a higher claim to truth, which might be
based on what Smart describes as "an undeniably non-legal criterion" of the best
interest of the child." When law operates under the old power, it incorporates the
new technologies to extend rights over one parent or another.52 However, when
law operates under the modern power (the discourse of normalization), it does not
45 Id. at 84, 86-87, 90-94 (noting that it is unclear whether the District even has a statute of limitations,
and also arguing that the process is unfair to the many men who have no reason to challenge a VAP
until after the government seeks child support, which is often after a year).
46 CAROL SMART, FEMINISM AND THE POWER OF LAW 8 (Maureen Cain & Carol Smart eds., 1989)
[hereinafter FEMINISM AND THE POWER OF LAW].
47 Id.
4 Id. at 8.
49 id.
'
0 d. at 11.
siId. at 16.
52 FEMINISM AND THE POWEROF LAW, supra note 46, at 16-17 (giving a surrogacy-adoption example).
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exercise power to extend rights, but defers to new technologies, such as science
and medicine, as having a higher claim to truth.5 3
One question is how law weighs various truth claims in determining
paternity. This is informed by competing interests, which include at least these
eight: the stability of the family (especially a marital family);5 4 the right of the
child to know his/her biological father;5 5 the right of a child to keep a relationship
with the father he/she has known;5 6 the duty of the biological father to support a
child and the unfairness that a non-biological father should support a child that is
not his;5 1 the right of a non-biological father to continue to raise a child he has
always believed and held out as his own; the finality of judgments; " the
prohibition against de-legitimizing a child or leaving a child fatherless; 59 and the
lesser rights afforded to non-marital fathers, who lose their paternity rights if they
fail to "develop a relationship" with their offspring.6 0
B. Absence of the Mother's Say in Paternity and Regulation of
Women's Sexuality
What is missing from this list of competing interests is any mention of the
mother's rights or interests in paternity. For instance, cases do not mention the
mother's right to choose who will be the functional "father" of her child. A woman
does not explicitly have this right in law, even if that is the effect of her actions,
such as when Julia, in The Celestials, chooses her husband to be the functional (or
psychological) father of her daughter.61
Even though women lack this legal right, some theorists, such as Gary Spitko
and June Carbone, have argued that a woman should have the right to choose the
5 Id. at 18 (giving an abortion example).
5 See Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 120, 124 (1989) (describing how inquiries into paternity
would harm "family integrity and privacy" and noting that "the Constitution protects the sanctity of
the family precisely because the institution of the family is deeply rooted in this Nation's history and
tradition").
ss This interest in knowing genetic truth applies to both the children and to alleged fathers. See Godin
v. Godin, 725 A.2d 904, 910 (Vt. 1998) (recognizing the interest of a biological father "in ascertaining
the true genetic makeup of the child").
56 Id. at 911 n.3 ("A finding of nonpaternity in this case would essentially leave the child without the
benefit of a father-child relationship, and the economic and emotional well-being that accompanies
it.").
1 See Niccol Kording, Nature v. Nurture: Children Left Fatherless and Family-Less When Nature
Prevails in Paternity Actions, 65 U. PITr. L. REv. 811, 848 (2004) ("[1]t would be unfair to hold the
father liable for years of child support for a child with whom he has no biological relationship.").
ss See Godin, 725 A.2d at 909 ("[T]he fundamental policy concerns that require finality of paternity
adjudications.").
" See Michael H., 491 U.S. at 161 (detailing the protection of a child "from the stigma of
illegitimacy").
a See Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 262 (1983).
SI SHEPARD, supra note 8, at 246-49.
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father of her children.62 Spitko bases his argument on what he describes as a
"labor-with-consent theory."63 Spitko urges that the father should be the man who
receives a mother's consent to be a father and when he puts in labor by acting as
a father in supporting the child and developing emotional bonds to the child.'
Under Spitko's theory, a father's biological status alone is not sufficient labor;
rather, a man must have "performed sufficient paternal labor" in order to have a
"right to develop or maintain a relationship with his child."65 Carbone generally
agrees with Spitko, but notes that courts should be careful to define "consent."66
Thus, Spitko and Carbone convincingly argue that the mother's consent
regarding who should be the child's other parent ought to carry great weight in
court decisions. Their argument can be extended to view paternity
disestablishment statutes and tort claims for false paternity as attempts to regulate
women's sexuality.
C. Paternity Fraud Torts
Although about ten states have case law allowing tort claims for paternity
fraud,67 another eight do not allow such claims for the reasons given in a 2000
Maryland case, Doe v. Doe, in which a wife had an affair with her art professor. 68
The Maryland Supreme Court held in Doe that the ex-husband could not sue the
ex-wife for tort claims (fraud and intentional infliction of mental distress) because
62 E. Gary Spitko, The Constitutional Function of Biological Paternity: Evidence of the Biological
Mother's Consent to the Biological Father's Co-Parenting ofHer Child, 48 ARIZ. L. REv. 97 (2006);
June Carbone, From Partners to Parents Revisited: How Will Ideas of Partnership Influence the
Emerging Definition of California Parenthood?, 7 WHITTIER J. CHILD & FAM. ADvoc. 3 (2007).
63 Spitko, supra note 62, at 121.
64 Id. at 104 (Spitko argues that the gestational labor of the mother "give[s] ... her status as the child's
initial constitutional parent . . . [who] enjoys the right to determine who shall be allowed to become
the child's second constitutional parent."). The labor-with-consent theory is "consistent with and helps
explain the Supreme Court's unwed father cases." Id. at 113.
6 Id. at 109 (noting that "[t]he biological father's role in conceiving the child is constitutionally
insignificant as labor").
6 Carbone, supra note 62, at 45-48, 54-55 (arguing that "consent should involve two components . .
. holding out to the public... [and] implied consent to the assumption of parental status.").
61 See DiMichele v. Perrella, 51 Conn. L. Rptr. 750 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2011); Koelle v. Zwiren, 672
N.E.2d 868 (Ill. App. Ct.. 1996); Dier v. Peters, 815 N.W.2d I (Iowa 2012); Denzik v. Denzik, 197
S.W.3d 108 (Ky. 2006); Mansfield v. Neff, 31 Mass. L. Rptr. 616 (Mass. Super. Ct. 2014); G.A.W.,
III v. D.M.W., 596 N.W.2d 284 (Minn. Ct. App. 1999); R.A.C. v. P.J.S., Jr., 927 A.2d 97 (N.J. 2007);
Miller v. Miller, 956 P.2d 887 (Ok. 1998); Hodge v. Craig, 382 S.W.3d 325 (Tenn. 2012); Masters v.
Worsley, 777 P.2d 499 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).
68 Doe v. Doe, 747 A.2d 617 (Md. 2000). See also, Coulson v. Steiner, 2015 WL 10013667 (D. Alaska
2015); Nagy v. Nagy, 210 Cal.App.3d 1262 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989); Steve H. v. Wendy S., 960 P.2d
510, 67 Cal.Rptr.2d 90 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998); Grand v. Hope, 617 S.E.2d 593 (Ga. Ct. App. 2005);
Renel v. Fortuna, 2014 WL 4628811 (Mich. Ct. App. 2014); Day v. Heller, 653 N.W.2d 475 (Neb.
2002); Hevey v. Hundley, 2013 WL 5782924 (Tex. App. 2013); Koestler v. Pollard, 471 N.W.2d 7
(Wis. 1991); St. Hilaire v. DeBlois, 721 A.2d 133 (Vt. 1998).
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the damages were for conduct formerly actionable under heart balm statutes,
which the state had abolished by the 1970s. 69
The underlying basis for heart balm statutes such as criminal conversation
was a man's right to bear his own children, which goes back to Anglo-Saxon law:
"inheritance, as well as social standing, was largely dependent upon the 'lawful
issue of pure blood."' 70 Thus, only a husband (and not a wife) could recover
damages for criminal conversation and adultery. 1 In Doe, the court rejected the
ex-husband's tort claim as it attempted to revive this cause of action that had been
abolished because "today's sense of the increasing personal and sexual freedom
of women is incompatible with the rationale underlying this action." 72 The Doe
court rejected the ex-husband's tort claim for the same reason; tort claims for false
paternity have the indirect effect of regulating women's sexuality.73
D. Inconsistencies Across Jurisdictions
What is especially intriguing about paternity law is not only that different
jurisdictions have different laws, but there can be inconsistency within a single
jurisdiction. When paternity law operates under the old view that truth is based on
kinship and best interests of the child, statutes provide that after a relatively short
time-two to four years-paternity of a husband should be conclusive.74 For
instance, in Texas, where there is a presumed father (such as a husband) paternity
challenges can be brought only within the first several years of a child's life.7
Similarly, where there has been a voluntary acknowledgment of paternity
("VAP"), a man can rescind it within sixty days of signing it, but after that he can
challenge it only on the basis of fraud, mistake, or duress-generally, states
impose a short time period for these challenges, as well.7 6 It should be noted that
while the laws for rescission and challenge of VAPs are federally mandated,
federal statutes do not define "fraud, duress, or mistake of fact," nor do federal
69 Doe v. Doe, 747 A.2d 617, 623 (Md. 2000).
'o Id. at 623 (quoting Jacob Lippman, The Breakdown of Consortium, 30 COLUM. L. REV. 651, 655
(1930)).
7 Id.
72 Id. at 623 (quoting Kline v. Ansell, 414 A.2d 929, 931 (Md. 1980)).
7 See id. at 621, 623. See also Fernanda G. Nicola, Intimate Liability: Emotional Harm, Family Law,
and Stereotyped Narratives in Interspousal Torts, 19 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 445, 467-69
(2013) (explaining state abolishment of amatory torts in response to sexual freedom). But see G.A.W.,
Ill v. D.M.W., 596 N.W.2d 284, 289 (Minn. Ct. App. 1999) (allowing tort claim for paternity fraud
on basis that although the legislature had abolished heart balm suits, if it had wanted to do so, it could
also have abolished all torts arising out of the marriage, but did not).
" See Theresa Glennon, Somebody's Child: Evaluating the Erosion of the Marital Presumption of
Paternity, 102 W. VA. L. REV. 547, 569-70 (2000) (noting a two-year statute of limitations under the
Uniform Parentage Act of 2000).
7 TEX. FAM. CODE §160.607 (2015) (providing for a four-year statute of limitations under its
enactment of the UPA).
76 See Jacobs, supra note 18, at 254-55.
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statutes include a limitations period, so these elements vary by state, as well. 7
Finally, under the old view, where there has been an adjudication (including a
divorce judgment), that adjudication is typically considered a final judgment. If a
final judgment is not appealed, it is nearly impossible to successfully challenge
on a bill of review (because the fraud is generally considered intrinsic, and only
extrinsic fraud may be challenged on a bill of review). In some jurisdictions,
moreover, future challenges to paternity are barred by estoppel or resjudicata. 5
However, under the modem view that associates truth with science, paternity
laws have substantially expanded men's ability to challenge paternity. Now, men
may challenge paternity adjudications and VAPs for almost unlimited time frames
under disestablishment statutes that allow a father to vacate paternity based on the
results of a DNA test, without consideration of the best interests of the child or
estoppel.' 9 Additionally, some jurisdictions provide that a man is not responsible
for past due child support if he vacates patemity.8 Moreover, in a handful of
jurisdictions that do not allow fathers to disestablish paternity, men may bring tort
actions for fraud and intentional infliction of mental distress (and possibly
negligent infliction of mental distress) against the mother, her lover, and her
parents if they were complicit in hiding paternity. " Included in the tort judgments
may be child support the man had paid.82
E. Jurisdictions Contain Internal Inconsistencies
Paternity laws vary wildly amongst the American states, but they also can
vary wildly within a single state. For instance, in Arkansas, a man who signs a
Voluntary Acknowledgment of Paternity ("VAP") can disestablish paternity
based on a genetic test, and can even be relieved of past-due child support, but a
man who is divorced cannot disestablish paternity because Arkansas considers the
divorce decree to bar future litigation under res judicata and public policy
reasons.83 Georgia's and Florida's laws arejust the reverse: a man can disestablish
paternity after an adjudication, but if he signs a VAP, he can disestablish paternity
" Id. at 255, 259.
7 Glennon, supra note 74, at 571-72, 576-77.
7 Jacobs, supra note 18, at 259-60.
o Id. at 264-65.
8' See Doe v. Doe, 747 A.2d 617 (Md. 2000). See also, Coulson v. Steiner, 2015 WL 10013667 (D.
Alaska. 2015); Nagy v. Nagy, 210 Cal.App.3d 1262 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989); Steve H. v. Wendy S., 960
P.2d 510,67 Cal.Rptr.2d 90 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998); Grand v. Hope, 617 S.E.2d 593 (Ga. Ct. App. 2005);
Renel v. Fortuna, 2014 WL 4628811 (Mich. Ct. App. 2014); Day v. Heller, 653 N.W.2d 475 (Neb.
2002); Hevey v. Hundley, 2013 WL 5782924 (Tex. App. 2013); Koestler v. Pollard, 471 N.W.2d 7
(Wis. 1991); St. Hilaire v. DeBlois, 721 A.2d 133 (Vt. 1998).
82 See, e.g., Dier v. Peters, 815 N.W.2d 1, 14 (Iowa 2012) (noting that according to Iowa code, a
putative father may be relieved of future but not past child support obligations); Denzik v. Denzik,
197 S.W.3d 108, 113 (Ky. 2006) (reinstating the jury verdict, award the putative father all child
support payments he made for the past five years.
8 Martin v. Pierce, 257 S.W.3d 82, 89-90 (Ark. 2007) (interpreting Ark. Code Ann. § 9-10-115 (2016)
and referencing Godin v. Godin, 725 A.2d 904 (Vt. 1998)).
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only by showing fraud, mistake, or duress within a certain time frame. 84
Furthermore, in Texas, a man who is adjudicated the father or who signs a VAP
without a genetic test can now petition to terminate parental rights within two
years of discovering he has been defrauded and is not the biological father." This
statutory provision is outside the Texas Uniform Parentage Act statutes, which
might bar a challenge in other states." What is especially illuminating is to look
at the discursive shifts in jurisdictions that move from the old view of rights
discourse to the new view of normalization discourse-and, as the discussion
below indicates, sometimes retain both in statutory schemes allowing
disestablishment under some circumstances.
1. The Old View
The 2005 Florida case of Parker v. Parker illustrates the old view and may
be contrasted with Florida's disestablishment statute enacted the year after Parker
was decided." In Parker, a married couple had a child, and the wife repeatedly
assured her husband that he was the father." When the child was three-and-a-half,
the couple divorced, and in the divorce proceedings, the wife again represented
that the husband was the father, so the divorce judgment stated that there was a
child of the marriage.89 This was a legal adjudication of paternity.90 Two years
later, when the child was about five, the ex-husband obtained DNA testing that
showed that he was not the father. 91 About two months after that, the ex-husband
filed a petition to disestablish paternity. 92 He alleged that the mother knew he was
not the father "due to sexual relations she had with another man" and that she
concealed that information in order to collect child support from him.9 3
The trial court dismissed his petition, which the appeals court affirmed
because the ex-husband did not challenge the divorce judgment within the one
year rule to set aside the judgment on the basis of extrinsic fraud, and moreover,
the wife's fraud would be considered intrinsic fraud, so he could not have
challenged it successfully even within a year. 94 The Parker appellate court
opinion discussed the policy reasons for not allowing a father to challenge
" GA. CODE ANN. §19-7-46.1(c) (2016); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 742.10(4) (2015).
8
s TEX. FAM. CODE § 161.005 (c)-(e) (West 2015).
86 The Texas Family Code contains the Uniform Parentage Act provisions in Chapter 160 and the
Termination of the Parent-Child Relationship provisions in Chapter 161.
1 Parker v. Parker, 916 So. 2d 926 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005).
* Id. at 927.
89 Id.
9 Id. at 929.
9i Id. at 927.
92 id.
93 Parker, 916 So. 2d at 927.
94 Id. at 934.
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paternity after a short period-the concern with finality and the overriding
concern with the "psychological devastation that the child will undoubtedly
experience from losing the only father he or she has ever known."9
Moreover, the court quoted a Vermont decision describing the father as
having a "belated and self-serving concern over a child's biological origins."96
The Vermont decision quoted in the court's opinion had even stronger
condemnation for a father who wants to disestablish parentage:
The fact that plaintiff chose for self-serving purposes to
jeopardize his relationship with [the child] is beyond our
control. We need not, however, award plaintiff a financial
windfall for his conduct, or deprive [the child] of not only a
father's affection, but also the legal rights and financial benefits
of the parental relationship.9 7
The solution for fathers, according to the Florida court in Parker, was to ask for
genetic testing before final adjudication as the legal father." The opinion recited,
"there may be some merit in telling divorcing fathers who are in doubt to 'test
now, or forever hold your peace."' 99
Thus, under the old view, if a father allows a judgment to be entered, or if he
signs an acknowledgment without a genetic test, he is considered selfish when he
later seeks to disestablish paternity. This view of the selfish father shows up in
other court decisions. For instance, Indiana has a strong public policy against
disestablishing paternity, and its court decisions contain strong metaphors. Some
Indiana decisions view requests for genetic tests as "fishing expedition[s]" and
allow paternity challenges only "in extreme and rare instances" because the state
has "no intention of creating 'a new tactical nuclear weapon for divorce
combatants."" 00 Thus, a father in Indiana has to discover non-paternity almost
inadvertently (like the father who learned only when he underwent genetic testing
because a child from his prior relationship was being treated for sickle cell
anemia)."ot
Under the old view of rights discourse, a court may declare a non-biological
father to be the legal father on the public policy of estoppel, of support for the
child, and of not delegitimizing the child. For instance, New York law deploys
the old view of rights discourse. In order to vacate an acknowledgment of
paternity, the court first holds a hearing to determine if there has been fraud,
9 Id. at 933.
9 Id. (quoting Godin v. Godin, 725 A.2d 904, 910 (Vt. 1998)).
9 Id. at 934 (quoting Godin, 725 A.2d at 911).
9 Id. at 932-33.
9 Parker, 916 So. 2d at 932.
.00 F.G. v. B.G., No. 49AO5-1210-DR-506, 2013 Ind. App. Unpub. LEXIS 364, at *5-6 (Ind. Ct. App.
Mar. 22, 2013).
.o. Fairrow v. Fairrow, 559 N.E.2d 597, 598 (Ind. 1990).
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mistake, or duress.' 02 If so, then the court holds a hearing to determine if it is in
the best interest of the child to order a genetic test."o3 If the named father has
established a relationship with the child, he will be estopped to deny paternity and
the court will refuse to order genetic testing. '" This was the case for the paternity
suit against rapper Black Rob (Robert Ross).'o The court of appeals reversed an
order for genetic testing on the grounds of estoppel: "the child, nearly five years
of age . .. recognized the respondent as her father and ... enjoyed a relationship
with him and members of his family."' 06
Under the old view of rights discourse, a man may nonetheless use a genetic
test showing non-paternity for reasons other than to vacate paternity. This
occurred in Alabama, when a husband who "persist[ed] in his status as the legal
father," used the DNA test as evidence of his wife's adultery in their divorce
suit. 107 Because the husband "persist[ed] in his status as the legal father," the
biological father was prevented from challenging paternity.'0 o The court indicated
that a husband might use DNA evidence for other reasons than to disprove
paternity, such as to confirm a biological relationship, to determine an accurate
medical history, or to show a wife's adultery-which would impact a property
division.109
2. The Modem View
The modern discourse of normalization that gives science a higher claim to
truth is expressed in legislation. An example is Florida's 2006 enactment issued
the year after the Parker case discussed above.I" Under the modem view, father's
rights prevail; or seen another way, science prevails. Florida's statute allows a
father to disestablish paternity even after a time he would have had no legal
remedy under the previous law. The statute provides that an adjudicated father
may disestablish paternity or terminate child support based on "newly discovered
evidence," i.e., a DNA test, without consideration of best interest of the child or
102 See In re Westchester Cty. Dep't of Soc. Servs. v. Robert W.R., 25 A.D.3d 62, 63 (N.Y. App. Div.
2005).
103 id.
'" Id. at 71.
05 Westchester Cty. Dep't of Soc. Servs. v. Robert W.R., 25 A.D.3d 62, 63 (N.Y. App. Div. 2005).
106 Robert W.R., 25 A.D.3d at 71.
'o' D.F.H. v. J.D.G., 125 So. 3d 146, 148 (Ala. Civ. App. 2013) (under the Alabama statute, "[i]f the
presumed father persists in his status as the legal father of a child, neither the mother nor any other
individual may maintain an action to disprove paternity" (quoting ALA. CODE § 26-17-607(a) (2009)).
o0 Id.
" Id. at 151-52.
10 FLA. STAT. § 742.18 (2006); Parker v. Parker, 916 So. 2d 926, 926 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005).
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estoppel."' The biggest issue Florida courts have decided is whether a man has to
pay arrearages for child support after paternity is vacated. 112
An example of the modem view under Florida's disestablishment law is the
case of Hickman v. Milsap, in which a child was bom out of wedlock, and the
mother brought a paternity action against the father when the child was four,
resulting in a paternity judgment and child support order.11 3 Six years later, when
the child was ten, the father disestablished paternity after DNA tests showed he
was not the father.'14 The appellate decision does not discuss whether the father
and child had any relationship; in fact, it does not discuss any interests, but is cut
and dry. Law yields to biological truth. Recent Florida cases allow
disestablishment even when the child is fifteen and living with his father.'
Florida's statute is not unique; in all, there are about eleven states with
disestablishment statutes."16
Other jurisdictions reach the same result for challenges based on fraud-
either as a challenge to a VAP, adjudication, or as a tort claim. For instance, in a
2002 Minnesota case, a man brought a challenge to an adjudication based on fraud
under the state's Rule 60, which allows a court to vacate the adjudication when
there is evidence of fraud."' In the 2002 case of In re Turner, the man (Turner)
accepted responsibility for a non-marital child after the mother (Suggs) told him
it was his child. Turner helped take care of the child and treated him as his son.'8
When the child was two, the parents signed a paternity affidavit; when the child
was five, the parents separated, and the county brought a paternity suit." 9 The
father again relied on the mother's "unequivocal representations regarding the
child's paternity," when he waived rights to a genetic test and was subsequently
adjudicated the father. 20 Later (the opinion does not say when), genetic tests
". FLA. STAT. § 742.18(1)(a) (2006); P.G. v. E.W., 75 So. 3d 777, 782-83 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011).
112 FLA. STAT. § 742.18(5) (stating only that "relief shall be limited to the issues of child support
payments").
... Hickman v. Milsap, 106 So. 3d, 513, 513 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013).
114 Id. at 513-14.
s P.G., 75 So. 3d at 777.
116 ALA. CODE § 26-17A-l(a) (2015) (Reopening a Paternity Case Based on Scientific Evidence);
ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 25-503(F) (2015) (Order for Support); FLA. STAT. § 742.18 (2015)
(Disestablishment of Paternity or Termination of Child Support Obligation); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-7-
54 (2016) (Motion to Set Aside Determination of Paternity); IDAHO CODE § 32-1009 (2016) (Paternity
Fraud-Child Support Restitution); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 45/7 (b-5) (2015); MD. CODE ANN. FAM.
LAW CODE § 5-1038 (LexisNexis 2015); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 722.1438 (2016); Miss. CODE ANN.
§ 93-9-10 (2015) (Disestablishment of Paternity); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:1748(b) & § 9:1748(d) (West
2015); TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.005 (West 2015) (Termination When Parent Is Petitioner).
"7 Turner v. Suggs, 653 N.W.2d 458, 465 (Minn. App. 2002).





showed that Turner was not the father and he brought a motion to vacate a
paternity judgment, which the trial court dismissed. 121
On appcal, the court reversed and remanded, holding that there was not a
statute of limitations to vacate paternity on the basis of fraud, and moreover that
the best interests of the child were "irrelevant" because "[t]he objective of
paternity proceedings is to correctly identify the biological father of a child," and
"biological paternity is an objective fact." 1 22 The court took the opposite view
from the Florida court in Parker, which placed the burden of ascertaining
paternity on the father at the time of the adjudication. Rather, in the Minnesota
case of In re Turner, the court reasoned that a father should not be "penalized for
not seeking genetic tests before stipulating to paternity" because he should be
entitled to believe "the sworn statements" of a woman with whom he had been
sexually intimate, resulting in a child. 123 The court further reasoned that expecting
men to disbelieve their sexual intimates "would result ... in a judicially mandated
atmosphere of distrust and acrimony that is contrary to public policy strongly
favoring stipulations in family cases."l24
Cases such as Parker and In re Turner demonstrate how legal discourse has
shifted away from the more complex rights discourse and best interests of the
child analysis to a discourse placing highest value on scientific truth. Thus,
modern law shifts from Strindberg's truth in The Father that no man knows he is
a child's father, and the old view (expressed in some cases) that fathers who want
to disestablish paternity are selfish, to the modern view that biology should prevail
against women who have defrauded them-fraud being shown solely on the basis
of DNA tests. This modem view sometimes stigmatizes a woman's sexuality and
destroys her power to choose the father of her child. For example in JR. v D.P.,
a California court was asked to resolve paternity when there were two presumed
fathers. 125 The court resolved the issue on the basis of biology, against the
husband who had held out as the father and raised the child. 126 The court rejected
the mother's choice of a father, basing its decision on the "weightier
considerations of policy and logic." 27
This shift to the modern view can be seen in Texas as well. The legislature in
2011 enacted a statute that allows for termination of parental rights based on
misrepresentations about paternity. 128 The statute, which is outside the UPA
121 Id.
122 Id. at 468.
123 Turner, 653 N.W.2d at 466.
124 Id. at 467.
125 JR. v. D.P., 212 Cal. App. 4th 374, 378 (2012).
126 Id. at 389.
127 Id.
128 Tex. Fam. Code § 161.005 (West 2015) (describing that the section is entitled "Termination When
Parent is Petitioner.").
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provisions of the Texas Family Code, allows a man to petition to terminate
parental rights when there has been an adjudication or when he has signed a VAP
based on misrepresentations, and when genetic tests exclude the man as the
father.1 29 There is no best interests of the child analysis.' 30 Rather, a man may
petition to terminate parental rights within two years of discovering the
misrepresentation.' 3 1 He may also request access to the child, though he will be
relieved from child support obligations.1 32
Before the enactment, Texas followed a rights discourse, as an earlier case
indicates: "Being a parent has always meant more than simply proving [that] the
DNA necessary to create human life originated from a particular individual ...
The judgment at issue in this case should not be set aside because one of the
individuals involved has become unhappy with the continued existence of it."'33
After enactment, a judgment or VAP can now be set aside based on a man's
unhappiness with the continuation of a parent-child relationship on the basis that
it lacks a biological tie. Thus, in Texas, like other jurisdictions, discourse has
shifted to place the highest value on scientific truth. As discussed next, this results
in a blind spot in legal analysis.
III. FAMILY SECRETS
Legal cases typically elide reasons a woman might have for not disclosing
her knowledge or uncertainty about paternity. For example, In re Turner, the
Minnesota case discussed above, the mother asserted from the child's birth that
Suggs was the only possible father.13 4 The couple was not married, but based on
her statements Suggs supported the child.1 35 When the child was two, the mother
signed an affidavit of paternity, and when the child was five, she testified in an
adjudication hearing that Suggs was the father.' Even when Suggs claimed that
genetic tests excluded him as the father and sought to vacate the paternity
adjudication, the mother "continue[d] to maintain that [Suggs was] the only
possible father of the child" and made sworn statements under oath. 137 The
appellate decision remanding the case gives no indication why the mother might
have kept paternity (or paternity uncertainty) a secret. In fact, like In re Turner,
most cases shed little insight into why a woman might not reveal the truth about
129 Tex. Fam. Code § 161.005(c) (West 2015).
130 See In re J.K.B., 439 S.W.3d 442, 450-51 (Tex. App. 2014) (holding that "termination under
subsection (c) does not include a best-interest determination").
13' Tex. Fain. Code § 161.005(e) (West 2015).
132 See Tex. Fain. Code § 161.005(i), (1) (West 2015).
133 Ince v. Ince, 58 S.W.3d 187, 191 (Tex. App. 2001).
134 TuTner v. Suggs, 653 N.W.2d 458, 462 (Minn. Ct. App. 2002).
135 Id.
136 I
117 Id. at 465-66.
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paternity or paternity uncertainty; instead, law elides the reasons a woman might
keep these secrets, as the following discussion shows.
In an Australian study of paternity stories, Lyn Turney discovered that while
society generally demonizes women accused of paternity fraud, there are multiple
reasons women keep paternity issues secret-both when they have knowledge
about false paternity, and also when they have questions about paternity
certainty. " Turney found several reasons for secrets, which can be broadly
categorized as secrets resulting from domestic violence or sexual assault; secrets
based on uncertainty about who the father was; and secrets resulting from the
passage of time and family ties.'39 Rather than finding that women kept secrets
merely to defraud men, Turney found "that paternity secrets are deeply held,
complex, and difficult to disclose." 40 Likewise, in her research on family secrets,
Carol Smart argues that oftentimes, women keep paternity secrets to protect
children and families.' 4 ' Because kinship is a complex relationship of ties to "both
relatives and others defined as close or as elective kin," 42 Smart argues for a
sociological understanding of paternity secrets.1 43 In other words, we should take
into account "the local morality of [the] family," the culture, and the importance
of kinship networks likely to be destroyed by genetic truth.'"
In contrast to Turney's broad categories, which are illustrated below with
case law, Smart found a "rough chronology of reproductive secrets" based on
societal shifts in what is considered taboo.145 Thus, in the late nineteenth century,
family reproductive secrets concerned highly stigmatized illegitimacy (as in The
Father and The Celestials); in the twentieth century, illegitimacy was no longer
as shameful, but now family secrets involved "pre-marital conceptions [which]
were a matter of great shame." 46 Then in the 1950s and 1960s, family secrets
shifted to adoptions, especially instances in which adults learned late in life that
' Turney, supra note 15, at 234-43 (her study consisted of interviews of fifty "men and women who
volunteered to tell about their experience of paternity testing and paternity uncertainty"). See also
Carol Smart, Families, Secrets and Memories, 45 Soc. 539, 541 (2011) (studying "an archive [going
back to the 1930s] based at the University of Sussex which collects written narratives from a panel of
regular writers who are invited to respond three times a year to a set of questions").
139 See Turney, supra note 15, at 234-43.
40 Id. at 243.
141 Carol Smart, Law and the Regulation of Family Secrets, 24 INT'L J.L. POL'Y, & FAM. 397, 400
(2010) [hereinafter Law & Regulation].
142 Carol Smart, Family Secrets: Law and Understandings of Openness in Everyday Relationships, 38
J. Soc. POL. 551, 555 (2009) [hereinafter Family Secrets] (noting that "[t]he clichds 'Blood is thicker
than water' and 'You can choose your friends but not your family' seem to be equally prevalent and
now, in addition, more people refer to families of choice. .
43 Id. at 555.
* Law & Regulation, supra note 141, at 410. See also, Susan Ayres, The Hand That Rocks the Cradle:
How Children s Literature Reflects Motherhood, Identity, and International Adoption, 10 TEX.
WESLEYAN L. REV. 315, 319-321 (2004) (examining the kinship narrative in adoption stories).
145 Family Secrets, supra note 142, at 558.
'4 Id.; see STRINDBERG, supra note 7; SHEPARD, supra note 8.
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they had been adopted. 147 Finally, Smart found that modem secrets concern
assisted reproduction (not telling the child or family members) and paternity
uncertainty. 148
As mentioned above, case law discussing paternity adjudications typically
ignores reasons a mother might have for keeping paternity secret-that is simply
not part of the judicial equation. For each category discussed below, there is scant
case law illustrating the reasons Turney found in her study. However, considering
these reasons is important to counterbalance the negative views of women as
acting intentionally to defraud men. 149
A. Secrets Resulting from Domestic Violence or Sexual Assault
In her study, Turney found that some women were victims of domestic
violence, and they did not want to suffer more battering by revealing paternity
uncertainty.i"o Of the over one hundred paternity cases reviewed for this Article,
only one openly discusses domestic violence. In the New York case of Jeannette
GG v. Lamont HH, a mother sought to overturn a father's (Lamont's)
acknowledgment of paternity and to name another man the father on the basis of
duress in signing the acknowledgment.' 5 1 Genetic tests showed that the other man
was indeed the biological father.' 5 2 However, Lamont battered the mother for
years."' She testified that he had burned her with cigarettes, raped her, taken her
earnings, and after she left him, "broke into her house."'54 When she went to the
hospital to have the child, Lamont and his family went with her, and Lamont
yelled at the nurse when he learned that the birth certificate did not list his name
as the father; he "insisted" that Jeannette go to the nurse's station and sign the
acknowledgment listing him as the father, which she did."' The appellate court
remanded to allow Jeannette to produce expert testimony on domestic violence in
order to show she signed the acknowledgement under duress, based on "her fear
of his anger and future violence."l 56
Turney's study showed that a similar reason women keep paternity issues a
secret is that they have been raped and did not want to disclose the biological
147Id. at 559.
14 Id. at 560.
149 See Turney, supra note 15, at 234; However, Tumey admits that her study does not "claim that no
woman has ever cheated, lied, or deceived." Id.
"s Id. at 240.
1s' Jeannette GG. v. Lamont HH., 77 A.D.3d 1076, 1076-77 (App. Div. 2010).
52 Id. at 1076.
153 Id. at 1077.
5 Id.




father.s 7 Again, this is very rare in case law, appearing in the 2013 case of Ralda-
Sanden v. Sanden. 158 Before she became pregnant, the mother's employer
repeatedly raped her when she was working for his family as a nanny from
Guatemala.' 59 She then became pregnant as a result of rape, and refused to have
an abortion.' 60 During one of her employer's attacks, she ran away, filed charges
against him, and eventually gave birth to a daughter.'61 She never had contact with
the father, and although she did tell the Attorney General's office his name, it
"declined to recoup child support payments ... to protect [the daughter] from the
gruesome truth about her conception." 62
The mother later told her daughter that her father had been killed in an
automobile accident because she did not want her daughter to know about the rape
and his threats to hurt her family.'6 3 Her daughter repeatedly asked who her father
was, and after her daughter turned twenty, during "a heated argument," the mother
finally told her the truth, so the daughter was able to track down the father and
file a paternity suit against him.' The issue before the court of appeals was
whether the statute of limitations (two years after child reaches majority) should
have been equitably tolled. 165 The court of appeals held that the limitations period
indeed should have been tolled, from which one could infer that the father's
violence was an understandable reason for the mother to withhold the truth about
paternity.166
B. Secrets Resulting from Paternity Uncertainty
According to Tumey, another reason why women kept secrets about paternity
is because they were uncertain themselves who the father was.' 67 Tumey refers to
this situation not as paternity fraud, but paternity uncertainty.' 6 For instance, if a
woman had overlapping relationships or a one-night stand during an otherwise
monogamous relationship, she might find herself uncertain about paternity and
typically "assume .... the father to be the man of the most enduring and regular
sexual relationship."'69 This appears to be the situation in several cases and courts
57 Turney, supra note 15, at 242.
Ralda-Sanden v. Sanden, 989 N.E.2d 1143 (111. App. Ct. 2013).
* Id. at 1145.
160 Id.
6' Id. at 1145-46.
62 Id. at 1 56.
6' Id. at 1178.
164 Ralda-Sanden, 989 N.E.2d at 1148-49.
s65 Id. at 1146-48.
166 Id. at 1149.
167 Turney, supra note 15, at 235-36.
i6 Id. at 236.
169 Id.
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can be obtuse about paternity uncertainty. For example, a Kentucky court held
there was a reasonable inference of paternity fraud when a woman had sex more
often with her lover than her husband, and the court stated that the woman "should
have known that it was more likely that [her husband] was not the father."o1 7
Paternity uncertainty also occurs when pregnant teenagers are ashamed to reveal
to their parents or boyfriends that they have had multiple partners, and as a result,
did not know who the father of their child was. 171 A final situation in which
paternity uncertainty occurs is when a woman is pressured to name a father in
order to execute a VAP or to receive Title IV-D benefits.1 72
C. Secrets Resulting from the Passage of Time and Family Ties
Additionally, Turney determined that one of the primary obstacles to
revealing paternity secrets was the passage of time: "Women reported that, while
the imperative to confess their secret was strong, the pragmatics of doing so
seemed to be destructive of family and interpersonal relationships.""' This was
certainly the case for Julia in The Celestials. 174 When Julia learned she was
pregnant and passed the common time for miscarriage (she had already had
thirteen miscarriages in her twenty-four years of marriage), she and her husband
went to Florida for a vacation.' 1 It was "a lovely time," and Julia imagined
Sampson "would greet her news with joy" because they had both been waiting a
long time for a child.1 76 However, she did not tell him she was uncertain about
paternity because: "She knew her time of remaining silent was slipping away, but
it was in many ways a lovely silence, and betrayal and secrets lead to more of the
same."17 7
Related to the passage of time, Turney discovered that "children were often
the main reason women gave for keeping their paternity secret. [Women's]
appreciation of the importance of the social bond that had developed between the
170 Denzik v. Denzik, 197 S.W.3d 108 (Ky. 2006).
1' See Hodge v. Craig, 382 S.W.3d 325 (Tenn. 2012). Hodge v. Craig does not explicitly describe the
teenaged mother as being ashamed, but describes a scenario of a teenaged girl having multiple sexual
partners. Id. See also Tumey, supra note 15, at 239.
172 See Rogus, supra note 39, at 75-77 ("Federal policy incentivizes state governments to maintain
high rates of paternity establishment); 96-97 (noting that VAPs signed in hospitals after childbirth
account for the majority of paternity establishments, however, childbirth is a stressful time and parties
"bay feel pressured to sign by extended family members who are present at the birth"); See also
Weaver v. Solone, 2006 WL 2730425 at *1-2 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2006) (noting that "welfare recipients
are required to cooperate in the identification of the non-custodial parent" and that mothers who do
not "cooperate in identifying the father of her child" will receive reduced benefits. Moreover, most
paternity adjudications are determined by default).
173 Turney, supra note 15, at 238.
1' See SHEPARD, supra note 8.
', Id. at 17-18, 178-79.
'




father and child prevented exposure of their secret.""' This is not discussed in
case law except under the old view as a justification for estoppel, which can be
seen in jurisdictions that refuse to order genetic testing because the child has
formed a relationship with the man believed to be the father.' 7 9
D. Legal Discourse Should Take These Reasons into Account
The reasons Turney discovered for paternity secrets sometime peep out of the
facts of legal cases, but more often than not, judges and society assume that
mothers hold knowledge about paternity and keep it to themselves for selfish
reasons. A West Virginia decision states: "[F]raudulent conduct exists in every
case where a wife gives birth to a child cognizant of the fact that paternity is
uncertain, yet remains silent while her husband innocently assumes the care of the
child."' Contrary to this damning view, Turney concludes "paternity secrets are
deeply held, complex, and difficult to disclose."'"' Yet, legal cases rarely offer
reasons a woman might keep paternity secrets; instead, it is much more common
for the facts of multiple partners to be stated objectively or for incongruent genetic
tests to be proof of a mother's fraud.
Legal decision-making and legislation could benefit from the point of
Tumey's research, which is not "[T]hat women are always blameless . .. ," but to
provide a balance to the moral panic and demonization of women surrounding
paternity fraud. 182 Tumey wisely suggests that society should view these
"intensely private matters" not in a "moralistic, judgmental, and politicised. . . ."
fashion, but instead should "consider them to be unintended outcomes of the
human condition; that is, human mistakes made by the actions of women and men
in the context of intimate relationships."'83 The tendency of the law to elevate
science as the highest consideration in truth claims is a flawed approach. It is
important to halt the tendency to oversimplify. Rather, courts and laws should sort
out reproductive secrets about paternity in the "[s]ocial, legal and cultural
context."' 84 Perhaps courts and laws should even allow for multiple fathers, as did
the trial court in DiMichele v. Perrella, discussed below.
'8 Turney, supra note 15, at 235.
179 See, e.g., In re Westchester Cty. Dep't of Soc. Services ex. Rel Melissa B. v. Robert W.R., 803
N.Y.S.2d 672 (N.Y. App. Div. 2005) (noting that in a paternity challenge where the challenging party
seeks a genetic test, the court must first conduct a hearing regarding the best interests of the child
before allowing the genetic test, on the basis of equitable estoppel).
"so Betty L.W. v. William E.W., 569 S.E.2d 77, 87-88 (W. Va. 2002) (citing William L. v. Cindy E.L.,
495 S.E. 2d. 836, 842 (1997)).
si Turney, supra note 15, at 243.
82 Id. at 243-44.
8 Id. at 245.
* Family Secrets, supra note 142, at 557.
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IV. CONCLUSION
The trial court in the case of DiMichele v. Perrella did take into account these
complex, intimate relationships, and it came up with a solution that is both
creative and troubling."' The trial court's tort judgment (reversed on appeal), is
disturbing. 186 However, the trial court's solution of allowing two fathers-a
biological father and a psychological father-is creative.18 7
In DiMichele v. Perrella, the mother immigrated to the United States from
Brazil when she was nine.'1 8 Later, when she began working, she had an affair
with her supervisor, who was sixteen years older than she.' 89 She continued this
affair without her husband's knowledge after they married in 1994.190 She then
had two children, one in 1996 and another in 1998."91 When the first child was
born, the mother determined through genetic testing that her lover was the
father.1 92 She did not tell her husband, and after she had the second child, she
assumed her lover was the father;1 93 a later DNA test confirmed this.194 She took
the children to see her lover until the children became suspicious about why they
had to keep the visits secret from the man they called their father. 195 They first
voiced their suspicions when the oldest child was about nine.1 96
When she stopped taking her children to see her lover, he filed a petition for
visitation and custody, which is how her husband learned there was a question
about his paternity.1 97 Complicated legal proceedings ensued. In 2008, a court
ordered that the husband and wife would have legal custody, and the lover (who
was the biological father of both children) would have visitation rights and would
pay child support.' 98 Two years after that, in 2010, the husband brought a tort suit
against the lover, and eventually the wife was joined as a codefendant after the
1ss DiMichele v. Perrella, No. CV1060045365, 2014 WL 2022243, at *1 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2014).
186 DiMichele v. Perrella, 120 A.3d 551, 554-55 (Conn. App. 2015) (the appeals court reversing the
tort judgment on the basis that the biological father owed no duty to disclose his paternity to the
psychological father because there was not a special relationship between them).
18' DiMichele v. Perrella, No. CV106004536, 2011 WL 1026184, at *1, *6 (Super. Ct. Conn. Feb. 23,
2011).
'n DiMichele, 2014 WL 2022243, at *9.
19 Id. at *1.
9 Id. at. *1, n.1.
19' Id. at *1.
192 Id.
193 Id.
1 DiMichele, 2014 WL 2022243, at *1.
s DiMichele v. Perrella, No. CV106004536, 2011 WL 1026184, at *1 (Super. Ct. Conn. Feb. 23,
2011).
'96 See DiMichele v. Perrella, 120 A.3d 551, 552 (Conn. App. Ct. 2015).
'
97 See DiMichele, 2011 WL 1026184, at*1..
'9 Id. at *1 nI.
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husband prevailed on the lover's motion to dismiss.199 The husband and wife
continued to live together until 2013, and a bench trial was held in 2014.200
Ultimately, the husband prevailed on his fraud claim, and the court entered a
judgment in the amount of $15,000 each against the lover and the wife.201' The
fraud claim was based on the lover's and wife's duty to disclose paternity. 202 The
trial court found that the lover had a duty to disclose that the husband was not the
biological father based in part on the children's fundamental interest in knowing
their paternity and, in part, because both men were considered fathers under
Connecticut law-the lover as the biological parent, and the husband as the
psychological parent.203 Further, the trial court held the lover owed a duty to the
husband and children to reveal his paternity. The lover defrauded the husband by
allowing him to psychologically and physically support the children, so the court
concluded that the lover "not only violated the 'plain rules of common honesty,'
but acted contrary to any concept of common decency." 204
The lover appealed. The appellate court reversed the tort judgment for fraud.
It held that the biological father had no duty to reveal paternity to the
psychological (or functional) father because a "'special relationship' of "'trust
and confidence' did not exist between them.205
Connecticut is not alone in allowing tort claims for paternity fraud. As
discussed above, about ten states allow such suits. 206 This trend of allowing
paternity fraud tort suits is troubling for reasons that many feminist theorists have
explored.207 Specifically, such torts regulate women's sexuality, promoting "the
honor of the family and . . . traditional sexual behaviors in marriage." 208 These
'9 DiMichele, 120 A.3d at 553 (noting that the husband also brought suit for intentional and negligent
infliction of emotional distress and for unjust enrichment, but only his fraud claim and intentional
infliction of emotional distress claim survived pretrial motions). DiMichele, 2011 WL 1026184, at *2-
5 (dismissing unjust enrichment claim). DiMichele, 2014 WL 2022243, at *4 (striking the negligent
infliction of emotional distress claim as barred by the statute of limitations). The trial court found
against the husband for intentional infliction of emotional distress because he was not visibly outraged.
DiMichele, 2014 WL 2022243, at *10.
200 DiMichele, 2014 WL 2022243, at * 1.
201 Id. at *11.
202 DiMichele, 2011 WL 1026184, at *4-6; DiMichele, 2014 WL 2022243, at *4, 8.
203 DiMichele, 2014 WL 2022243, at *6.
204 DiMichele, 2011 WL 1026184, at *6.
205 DiMichele, 120 A.3d 551, 554-55, 727.
206 See DiMichele v. Perrella, 2011 WL 1026184 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2011); Koelle v. Zwiren, 672
N.E.2d 868 (111. App. Ct. 1996); Dier v. Peters, 815 N.W.2d I (Iowa 2012); Denzik v. Denzik, 197
S.W.3d 108 (Ky. 2006); Mansfield v. Neff, 31 Mass. L. Rptr. 616 (Mass. Super. Ct. 2014); GAW, III
v. DMW, 596 N.W.2d 284 (Minn. Ct. App. 1999); RAC v. PJS, Jr., 927 A.2d 97 (N.J. 2007); Miller
v. Miller, 956 P.2d 887 (Ok. 1998); Hodge v. Craig, 382 S.W.3d 325 (Tenn. 2012); Master v. Worsley,
777 P.2d 499 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).
207 See Nicola, supra note 73, at 470.
208 Id.
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torts also hark back to amatory torts, which most jurisdictions have abolished, and
have the effect of punishing "[t]he cheating wife" and of rewarding "the
cuckolded husband." 209
However, the solution in DiMichelle of allowing two legal fathers-a
biological and psychological father-is both creative and empowering to women
and children. 210 While the husband in that case would have been estopped under
Connecticut law from denying paternity, by his actions, it appeared he wanted to
assert his paternity instead. He continued to live with his wife and was given legal
custody as the children's psychological father.2 1' He appears to be a husband like
Sampson in The Celestials, who came around to his wife's adultery and accepted
the child as his own. The concept of allowing biological and psychological fathers
might be utopian hopefulness, but perhaps not, with California legislation
scheduled to allow multiple parents, and English legislation to allow three parents
in surrogacy procedures. However, the law should probably also accommodate
fathers who, like the Captain in Strindberg's play, reject children not biologically
theirs. These are not simple cases, but complex ones both legally and socially.
While this Article does not provide a normative framework or easy solution,
it urges caution in elevating science as the highest consideration in truth claims
about paternity, and urges legal discourse to include a vocabulary of reasons a
mother may have for keeping paternity secrets. The arguments of Lyn Turney and
Carol Smart for a sociological understanding of family secrets would inform and
possibly cool the judicial and legislative trend to supplant "complex kinship ties"
with genetic truth. 212 Instead of demonizing women, society might recognize that
many women keep paternity secrets not to defraud men, but as "a desire to care
for and protect their children." 2 13
20 Id. at 473; see also id. at 493-94.
210 See, e.g., Nancy E. Dowd, Multiple Parents/Multiple Fathers, 9 J.L. & FAM. STUD. 231 (2007)
(explaining the benefits of a two-parent model).
21 DiMichele v. Perrella, 2011 WL 1026184 (Super. Ct. Conn. Feb. 23, 2011), at *6 (defining a
"psychological parent" as "one who, on a continuing, day-to-day basis, through interaction,
companionship, interplay and mutuality, fulfills the child's psychological needs for a parent, as well
as the child's physical needs.").
212 Law & Regulation, supra note 141, at 411.
213 Id.
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